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THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT: AS 
CONFLICT RAGES ON, THE UNITED STATES 
V. NOSAL RULING PROVIDES EMPLOYERS 
CLEAR GUIDANCE 
Ryan E. Dosh 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, industrial espionage cost U.S. businesses more than 
$250 billion.1 While this figure represents all forms of industrial 
espionage, companies often neglect a class of perpetrators that would 
be easy to foil: internal employee hackers.2 It is a common scenario 
for employees, or soon-to-be-former employees, to download 
sensitive business information in violation of corporate policy.3 Over 
the past several years, employers aware of internal breaches have 
taken legal action by filing state and federal claims against rogue 
employees.4 One weapon in their arsenal is to claim a violation of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),5 the United States’ most 
far-reaching computer statute.6 However, federal courts are greatly 
conflicted over the scope of the CFAA: whether it only establishes 
penalties for accessing information or if it is broad enough to include 
the misuse of information.7 The Ninth Circuit created a circuit split 
 
  J.D., May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. 2011, California Lutheran 
University. A special thank you to my friends and family, and in particular, to my late father for 
his unconditional support and guidance. 
 1. Insider Data Theft: When Good Employees Go Bad, SYMANTEC (Dec. 12, 2011), 
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/insider-data-theft-when-good-employees-go-bad. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Leslie Paul Machado, Protecting Against Employee Theft, HUM. RESOURCES 
EXECUTIVE ONLINE (July 12, 2010), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/view/story.jhtml?id= 
475264808&ss=machado. 
 4. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC v. 
Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-158), 2012 WL 5353899. 
 5. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008). 
 6. See id.; Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561 (2010). 
 7. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 8–9. 
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with United States v. Nosal,8 holding that the CFAA only covers the 
“unauthorized access” of computer information, not its misuse, as the 
First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits’ broad interpretations of 
the CFAA have held.9 Thus, employers are stuck between an 
employer-friendly interpretation of the CFAA and an employee-
friendly interpretation, depending on which jurisdiction they are in.10 
This Comment explores the federal circuit split over the 
CFAA’s scope and its effect on employers looking to bring CFAA 
claims against “rogue employees.” Part II explores the history of the 
CFAA, its current posture, and the sections of the statute that are 
most cited by employers bringing CFAA claims against former 
employees. Part III analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation 
of the CFAA in its en banc holding in United States v. Nosal. Part IV 
addresses the widening circuit split over the broad and narrow 
interpretations of the CFAA, while Part V supports the argument that 
a narrow interpretation should prevail. Part VI then offers advice for 
employers hoping to preserve CFAA claims against rogue employees 
and solutions for protecting sensitive business information. Part VII 
concludes. 
II.  CFAA: HISTORY AND CURRENT POSTURE 
Congress originally enacted the CFAA in 1984 to protect 
government computers from unauthorized access and to combat 
newly emerging, ever-increasing computer crimes.11 The CFAA was 
the first federal statute to specifically address computer crimes.12 
Originally a purely criminal statute, the CFAA was limited in 
scope.13 The original version “criminalized only important federal 
interest computer crimes”—those relating to national security 
secrets, certain financial institutions, and government-owned and  
-operated computers.14 However, over the past twenty-eight years 
Congress has substantially expanded the statute in an attempt to keep 
 
 8. 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 9. Id. at 863. 
 10. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 6. 
 11. See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)). 
 12. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 1564. 
 13. See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, supra note 
11, at 2191. 
 14. Kerr, supra note 6, at 1561; see also Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act of 1984, supra note 11, at 2191. 
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pace with the rapidly changing computerized world.15 The statute’s 
scope now includes nearly every computer in the United States and 
millions of computers abroad.16 
The first significant amendment occurred in 1994, when 
Congress added a private cause of action to the statute.17 In turn, the 
1994 amendment gave any private party the right to “maintain a civil 
action against . . . violator[s]” of the CFAA.18 Later, in 1996, 
Congress expanded the CFAA’s scope again, by introducing the term 
“protected computer.”19 The CFAA’s authority then extended to any 
computer used by the government, by financial institutions, or in 
interstate commerce or communication.20 Again, in 2001, Congress 
extended the scope of the CFAA to include international 
computers.21 Most recently, a 2008 amendment expanded the 
definition of protected computers once again. The definition now 
includes any computer used by a financial institution, by the United 
States government, or by any computer used in or affecting foreign 
and interstate commerce and communications.22 As one author 
argued, “the CFAA [is] one of the most far-reaching criminal laws in 
the United States Code,”23 due to our increasing dependency on an 
internet-connected, computerized world. 
As a result of the statute’s evolution and broad definitions, 
private parties, especially employers, are bringing an increasing 
number of CFAA claims in federal court.24 The statute permits a 
“private party who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of 
‘the statute’” to bring a federal civil cause of action against the 
violator.25 Assuming the plaintiff can show damages of at least 
 
 15. Kerr, supra note 6, at 1563. 
 16. Id. at 1561. 
 17. Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit.XXIX, 108 Stat. 
2097. 
 18. Id. at 2098. 
 19. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, tit. II, 110 Stat. 3488, 3492. 
 20. Kerr, supra note 6, at 1567–68. 
 21. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272, 382–84 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C.). 
 22. Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-326, § 207, 
122 Stat. 3560, 3563 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B)). 
 23. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 1561. 
 24. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, ‘Unauthorized Access' and the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id= 
1202473140814. 
 25. Id. 
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$5,000 within any one-year period, a CFAA claim may be brought in 
federal courts, which gain federal question jurisdiction under the 
statute.26 Most claims brought under the statute are for unauthorized 
access to a computer or for access beyond the user's authorization 
level.27 
Thus, employers most frequently claim a CFAA violation under 
Section 1030(a)(2)28, against employees who “intentionally [access] 
a computer without authorization or [exceed] authorized access, and 
thereby [obtain] . . . information from any protected computer,”29 and 
Section 1030(a)(4), against those who “knowingly and with intent to 
defraud, [access] a protected computer without authorization, or 
[exceed] authorized access, and by means of such conduct [further] 
the intended fraud and [obtain] anything of value.”30 The statute 
defines “exceeding authorized access” as “access[ing] a computer 
with authorization and us[ing] such access to obtain or alter 
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to 
obtain or alter.”31 However, the statute fails to define “without 
authorization.”32 Therefore, the statute’s broad definition of a 
“protected computer,” in conjunction with the lack of a clear 
statutory definition for “authorization,” has left federal courts split as 
to the scope and meaning of the CFAA.33 
As federal courts continue to dispute the legislative intent 
behind the CFAA and the statute’s scope, Congress continues to 
propose legislation that is equally conflicted.34 What is certain is 
Congress’ original intent to create a single statute to cover the field 
of computer crime “rather than identify[] and amend[] every 
potentially applicable statute affected by advances in computer 
technology.”35 However, that does little to resolve a widening circuit 
 
 26. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(i)(I) (2006). 
 27. See Machado, supra note 3. 
      28.   See LINDA K. STEVENS & JESI J. CARLSON, THE CFAA: NEW REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYEE 
COMPUTER ABUSE 2 (2008), available at http://www.schiffhardin.com/binary/stevens_carlson 
_ibj_0308.pdf. 
 29. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2008). 
 30. Id. § 1030(a)(4). 
 31. Id. § 1030 (e)(6). 
 32. See id. § 1030. 
 33. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4. 
 34. Erin Fuchs, The Law Used To Target Aaron Swartz Doesn’t Make Sense Anymore, BUS. 
INSIDER (Jan. 20, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-reform-
2013-1. 
 35. S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 5 (1996). 
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split, nor does it help employers looking to “rein in rogue 
employees.”36 
III.  UNITED STATES V. NOSAL 
In Nosal, the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed the CFAA’s term 
“exceeds authorized access” to not cover unauthorized disclosure or 
fraudulent use of information, even if covered as prohibited conduct 
by a company’s computer-use agreement.37 Instead, the Nosal court 
stated that the CFAA only covers claims as to a computer’s access 
and not the misuse of information obtained by such access.38 There, 
the defendant, David Nosal, resigned from a major executive search 
firm, Korn/Ferry, after over eight years of service.39 As part of his 
departure from the firm, Nosal received $25,000 monthly 
compensation and two lump sums of money in exchange for signing 
a one-year non-compete agreement.40 However, Nosal left the firm 
intending to start his own business with the help of current 
Korn/Ferry employees.41 Nosal convinced two employees to 
download company information from a confidential database and 
transfer the information to him.42 The employees maintained valid 
credentials granting them access to the information, but violated an 
employee policy that forbade disclosing confidential information.43 
The government charged Nosal with violating the CFAA by aiding 
the employees in “exceeding authorized access” under Section 
1030(a)(4).44 Nosal then challenged the CFAA claims, stating that 
the statute only targets “hackers, not individuals who access a 
computer with authorization but then misuse the information they 
obtain by means of such access.”45 
The Nosal majority found the purpose of the statute was to 
“punish hacking” and not the misappropriation of trade secrets.46 The 
 
 36. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 37. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 856. 
 40. Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(No. 10-10038), aff’d en banc 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012), . 
 41. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 863. 
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court reasoned that the CFAA’s text “limited violations of 
restrictions on access to information, and not restrictions on its 
use.”47 The court found that the CFAA’s principal purpose was to 
target hackers, not to “allow private parties to manipulate their 
computer-use agreements and personnel policies so as to turn 
[employment] relationships into ones policed by the criminal law.”48 
Considerably concerned with expanding the scope of a criminal 
statute, the majority determined that the CFAA was not intended to 
criminalize minor computer misuses in the workplace.49 
The dissent in Nosal found that the statute’s purpose was to 
prevent the stealing of valuable information, regardless of who was 
the culprit.50 Significantly, however, the dissent acknowledged that 
this contested portion of the statute might be unconstitutionally 
vague.51 The Nosal court’s holding created a clear circuit split 
between the narrow interpretation penned by Judge Kozinski and the 
broad interpretation taken by several other federal circuits.52 
IV.  JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: WIDENING CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A widening circuit split has evolved over the interpretation of 
the CFAA’s terms “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized 
access.”53 The Fourth Circuit recently complicated the circuit split by 
aligning with the Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the CFAA 
in Nosal, in contrast with the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh 
Circuits’ broad interpretation.54 The conflict particularly revolves 
around employer-employee relationships and confidential database 
misuse.55 The meaning of the term “authorized” (or, put another way, 
“without or exceeds authorization”) sits at the core of the 
disagreement.56 
 
 47. Id. at 864. 
 48. Id. at 860. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 865. 
 51. Id. at 866. 
 52. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 6. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Ryan Patrick Murray, Myspace-ing Is Not a Crime: Why Breaching Terms of Service 
Agreements Should Not Implicate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 
475, 480–81 (2009). 
 56. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., United States v. Nosal: Rebooting the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, 8 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 257, 270–71 (2012). 
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A.  Broad Interpretation: Employee Liability 
The First,57 Fifth,58 Seventh,59 and Eleventh60 Circuits adopted a 
broad interpretation of the CFAA, which holds employees who are 
authorized to access a computer liable for using that access to steal or 
damage company data in violation of a computer-use policy.61 The 
circuits that adopted a broad interpretation rely on one of two modes 
of analysis when defining the “without authorization” and “exceeds 
authorized access” language.62 The first approach is based on a 
common law agency theory, and the second approach is based on 
mere violation of a computer use agreement and rooted in contract 
theory.63 Under the broad interpretation, both modes of reasoning are 
employer-friendly and determine that “without authorization” and 
“exceeds authorized access” extend to misuse of information, rather 
than just the access to it.64 
In International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin,65 the Seventh 
Circuit held that “an employee’s authorization to access his 
employer’s computer terminates when the employee uses the 
computer contrary to the employer’s interests, thereby breaching his 
duty of loyalty to his employer” and violating the CFAA.66 Citrin 
decided to start his own company, but before resigning, engaged in 
improper conduct by taking his employer’s marketing data for 
corporate mergers and permanently deleted the employer’s only copy 
of the files.67 Applying an agency theory, the court reasoned that 
when Citrin breached his duty of loyalty, his authorization to access 
the employer’s data terminated.68 Therefore, Citrin had accessed the 
computer “without authorization,” in violation of the CFAA.69 
The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits all recognize that an 
 
 57. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 58. United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 59. Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 60. United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 61. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 8. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. at 10. 
 64. Pamela Taylor, To Steal or Not to Steal: An Analysis of the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act and Its Effect on Employers, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 201, 203 (2012). 
 65. 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 66. Id. at 420–21; see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 7. 
 67. Complaint at 4, Int’l Airport Centers LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006) (No. 
03C 8104). 
 68. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21. 
 69. Id. 
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employee’s authority to access information is properly defined by a 
company’s computer usage policy, and that violating such a policy 
can serve as a basis for holding an employee liable under the 
CFAA.70 These circuits reason that “an employee ‘exceeds 
authorized access’ by violating employer-imposed restrictions on the 
purpose for which computer-stored information may be obtained.”71 
In EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc.,72 the First Circuit 
held that an employment agreement can establish the parameters of 
“authorized” access.73 There, as part of an employment agreement, 
the employee signed a broad confidentiality agreement that he 
violated when he attempted to “mine” his former employer’s 
website.74 The Fifth Circuit’s holding in United States v. John75 takes 
the First Circuit’s reasoning a step further. There, the court 
summarized the First Circuit, stating that “an employment agreement 
can establish the parameters of ‘authorized’ access” and thus 
determined that “the concept of ‘exceeds authorized access’ may 
include exceeding the purposes for which access is ‘authorized.’”76 
The employee in John used her valid credentials to access company 
information, removed highly sensitive and confidential information, 
and ultimately used it to perpetrate fraud.77 The Fifth Circuit found 
the employee accessed the information in violation of her employer’s 
employee policies, and knew the purpose for accessing the 
information was not “authorized.”78 Thus, the employee was found 
to be in violation of the CFAA.79 Lastly, in United States v. 
Rodriguez,80 the Eleventh Circuit held that an employee exceeded 
authorized access when he violated the employer’s policy by 
obtaining information for a non-business purpose.81 Although the 
defendant did not use the information to further another crime, the 
court found a violation of the CFAA.82 
 
 70. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 9. 
 71. Id. at 9–10. 
 72. 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 73. Id. at 581–82. 
 74. Id. at 582–83. 
 75. 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 76. Id. at 272. 
 77. Id. at 271–72. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 81. Id. at 1265. 
 82. Id. at 1260. 
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The First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits’ broad 
definitions of “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized 
access” provide employers federal recourse against an employee for 
the misuse of electronic data.83 Therefore, in these circuits, any 
violation of a company’s computer-use policy invites civil and 
criminal liability to employees.84 
B.  Narrow Interpretation: Employers Beware 
In United States v. Nosal, the Ninth Circuit held that the CFAA 
does not cover employee-hackers or insiders who take data from 
their employers and use it in an anticompetitive manner after leaving 
the company.85 Three months later, the Fourth Circuit agreed with 
the Ninth Circuit in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller,86 
holding that the CFAA is not violated when a former employee who 
received authorization to obtain or alter data when he or she was 
employed later misuses that information.87 The Fourth Circuit found 
that the CFAA prohibits only hacking and does not extend to 
misuse.88 
Similar to the Ninth Circuit in Nosal, the Fourth Circuit in WEC 
adopted a narrow reading of the CFAA and held that the statute 
applies “only when an individual accesses a computer without 
permission or obtains and alters information on a computer beyond 
that which he is authorized to access.”89 There, a WEC employee 
took computer data in violation of corporate policy, resigned and 
started working for a competitor, and then used WEC’s data to pitch 
a project to a customer.90 The court reasoned that the CFAA’s 
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” language 
means that one cannot gain admission to a computer without 
approval or gain access to information outside the scope of approved 
 
 83. See Robert B. Milligan, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Circuit Split Remain 
Unresolved: United States Supreme Court Challenge Dismissed, TRADING SECRETS 
(Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2013/01/articles/computer-fraud/computer-fraud 
-and-abuse-act-circuit-remains-unresolved/. 
 84. See id. 
 85. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 86. 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 87. Id. at 207. 
 88. Id. at 206. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 202. 
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access.91 As a result, the court declined to extend the CFAA’s scope 
to include the improper use of information that was validly accessed 
by the employee.92 As the CFAA is a criminal and civil statute, the 
Fourth Circuit was concerned with extending the statute’s reach to 
employees who simply failed to comply with a company’s computer-
use policies.93 
The Ninth and Fourth Circuits’ narrow interpretation of the 
CFAA holds that the statute prevents only hacking, or unauthorized 
access to a computer, and does not prohibit the misuse of such 
information.94 The courts were concerned with extending a criminal 
statute to include any computer-use agreement violations, however 
trivial.95 Thus, employers are limited in what claims can be brought 
against “rogue employees.”96 
V.  CLEAR STANDARD: NARROW INTERPRETATION 
The narrow interpretation of the CFAA articulated in Nosal, and 
recently supported by the Fourth Circuit, reserves the CFAA’s 
principal purpose as an anti-hacking statute, not an expansive 
misappropriation statute.97 Focusing on the plain language of the 
statute, and considering the “rule of lenity” and the goal of 
preventing suspected but not yet proven unauthorized access, a 
narrow interpretation is grounded in a sound analysis.98 Additionally, 
employers prevented from bringing CFAA claims are not without 
recourse, as other legal remedies exist for misuse grievances.99 As 
such, “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” 
should be construed narrowly, either by the Supreme Court or by 
Congress. 
The Nosal court construed a limited definition of the terms 
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access.”100 
Ultimately, the term “authorize,” as used in “without authorization” 
or “exceeds authorized access,” requires interpretation. The 
 
 91. Id. at 204. 
 92. Id. (emphasis added). 
 93. Id. at 205. 
 94. See id. at 207; United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 95. WEC, 687 F.3d at 207. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857. 
 98. See id. at 863. 
 99. See WEC, 687 F.3d at 207 n.4. 
 100. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863. 
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dictionary defines authorize as, “to grant official permission for or 
approval.”101 Authorize, then, must be read in conjunction with the 
meaning of access: “to gain admission to.”102 Therefore, an employer 
gives an employee permission to gain admission to a company 
computer when an employer “authorizes” the employee’s “access.” 
Thus, accessing a computer “without authorization” means to gain 
admission to it without permission.103 Similarly, an employee 
“exceeds authorized access” by using her approved admission to the 
computer to obtain or alter information that falls outside the bounds 
of her approved access.104 Both of these phrases deal with setting 
boundaries and exceeding them. The statute fails to mention misuse, 
and instead clearly addresses just the access of information.105 
Specifically, as the WEC court held, neither term extends “to the 
improper use of information validly accessed.”106 Instead, it is 
limited solely to the access. 
In contrast, circuits applying the broad interpretation of the 
CFAA define “authorizes,” in terms of state-law principals 
governing agency relationships.107 Therefore, employer authorization 
hinges on whether an employee is acting in the best interest of the 
employer or, conversely, in violation of an employment 
agreement.108 Thus, employment agreements and computer-use 
agreements drafted by employers arbitrarily determine when an 
employee either “exceeds authorized access” or uses a computer 
“without authorization,” by being without authority at certain 
moments.109 
 Accordingly, employees are constantly accessing a computer 
without authorization and then potentially misusing information.110 
 
 101. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 139 (2nd ed. 2001); WEBSTER'S THIRD 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 146 (2002). 
 102. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 139 (2nd ed. 2001). 
 103. See WEC, 687 F.3d at 206. 
 104. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859. 
 105. See id. 
 106. WEC, 687 F.3d at 204. 
 107. See Larkin, supra note 56, at 272–273. 
 108. Matthew Kapitanyan, Beyond Wargames: How the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Should Be Interpreted in the Employment Context, 7 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 405, 423 
(Winter 2012). 
 109. See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Appellee 
and Urging Affirmance at 1617, United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (No. 10-10038), 2010 WL 
6191781. 
 110. Brian Zemil, Federal Circuits Split on Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, LITIGATION 
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Throughout a normal workday, employees can be found violating 
employee computer-use agreements, simply through routine 
behavior.111 Employees perform personal, non-work related activities 
on corporate computers, from sending personal emails, to checking 
sports scores, to filling in the occasional sudoku.112 What then 
qualifies as a breach of the agreement, resulting in a CFAA 
violation? The standard is arbitrary. If Congress wanted the statute to 
capture those who misuse information they are otherwise entitled to 
access, it would have done so clearly.113 The Nosal court rightly held 
that it was implausible to think Congress intended to make a criminal 
law so expansive.114 Instead, even if they have not settled on the 
narrow interpretation, the courts should read an ambiguous statute, as 
opposing viewpoints indicate, strictly.115 
The narrow interpretation complies with the settled principle 
that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be 
resolved in favor of lenity.”116 The Supreme Court has held that a 
statute with both civil and criminal applications must be construed 
strictly.117 Statutory interpretation applied for criminal prosecution 
will also be applied in a civil action.118 If there is any doubt as to 
Congress’ intentions, “the lowest common denominator must 
govern.”119 Therefore, if ambiguity exists, as it does, a narrow 
interpretation should prevail. A broad interpretation could make 
felons out of millions of unsuspecting people.120 The CFAA could 
criminalize millions of employees for ordinary online behavior 
without being on notice of what conduct is criminally punishable.121 
Furthermore, employees will be subject to the employer’s 
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definition of a criminal statute. Allowing a broad interpretation of 
“authorize” delegates to a private party the power to define a federal 
criminal statute.122 As the Nosal court observed, simply performing 
any personal, non-work-related activity serves to violate computer- 
use agreements.123 Additionally, allowing the employer to define the 
criminal statute by defining “unauthorized access” in the computer 
use agreement leaves employees inadequately notified of what 
conduct is criminally punishable at any given time.124 Employee 
agreements and computer-use policies, which are privately created, 
frequently go unread and may be altered without notice.125 While 
minor misuse is far from stealing, a broad interpretation leaves the 
CFAA open to arbitrary enforcement and subject to violation by 
millions of employees on a daily basis.126 
A narrow interpretation not only provides a clearer standard, but 
also is “in accord with the initial spirit and purpose of the CFAA.”127 
As the court in Nosal found, “If Congress meant to expand the scope 
of criminal liability to everyone who uses a computer in violation of 
computer-use restrictions—which may well include everyone who 
uses a computer—we would expect it to use language better suited to 
that purpose.”128 Instead, the purpose is to punish hacking— 
the circumvention of technological access barriers—not 
misappropriation.129 Thus, the United States Supreme Court or 
Congress must take action to narrow private interpretation of the 
CFAA's scope. 
VI.  EMPLOYERS: IMPLEMENT PROTECTION 
While a circuit split and uncertainty of the CFAA’s scope 
continue to rage on, employers need to take protective steps in 
preserving their company data and potential CFAA claims.130 
Employers, especially in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, need to take 
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the necessary steps of establishing strict access guidelines and 
multiple levels of password protection.131 While a narrow 
interpretation restricts employers’ claims under the CFAA, 
understanding the Circuits’ holdings allows for employers to position 
themselves to potentially preserve their federal claims, and to better 
protect their data.132 
The first step is to establish strict access guidelines for 
employees.133 While the Ninth and Fourth Circuits held that 
computer-use agreements do not define when an employee lacks 
authorization or exceeds authorized access, establishing clear access 
guidelines can only help the company in a practical sense and 
potentially strengthen CFAA claims.134 Clarifying what access is 
permissible gives employees a better understanding of what 
constitutes a violation, and helps a company establish a framework 
for implementing protective measures.135 With data theft steadily on 
the rise, rewriting access guidelines will force employers to address 
the access issue and devise protective measures that effectively 
prioritize different types of information.136 Additionally, those 
jurisdictions that have not followed a narrow interpretation of the 
CFAA will have further ammunition in maintaining a CFAA 
claim.137 
Once companies set more detailed access guidelines, they can 
implement more restrictive access with the use of multiple levels of 
passwords.138 This extensive password-protection approach has been 
termed a “code-based” restriction by Professor Orin Kerr.139 Under 
this approach, employers assign detailed clearance levels for 
employees on a strict need-to-know basis.140 Employees will then 
only be able to access data necessary for particular responsibilities, 
limiting the risk of rogue employees retrieving confidential company 
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data.141 Limited access allows employers to better monitor sensitive 
business information.142 Furthermore, it will be clear when an 
employee accesses information “without authorization” or “exceeds 
authorized access.”143 
The ultimate goal is to curtail the ease of internal “hacking” and 
to protect sensitive business information.144 Even though a narrow 
interpretation of the CFAA limits employers’ federal judicial 
remedies, implementing restrictive-access measures strengthens data 
protection, possibly CFAA claims, and if nothing else, state law 
claims.145 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court recently dismissed a petition for Writ of 
Certiorari intended to address the circuit split, leaving CFAA’s scope 
dependent on which federal court reviews the claim.146 Additionally, 
contradictory legislation proposed in Congress fails to clarify the 
CFAA’s scope.147 Thus, the circuit split has no end in sight. The 
First, Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits broadly interpret the 
CFAA; the Fourth and Ninth Circuits interpret it narrowly. Yet, in 
terms of employer-employee relationships, a narrow interpretation 
should prevail and employers should prepare for a Supreme Court 
ruling confirming the Ninth Circuit’s approach. The Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in United States v. Nosal is grounded in sound judicial 
analysis and sets clear guidelines. Even though the conflict and 
widening circuit split rages on, employers need to take steps to 
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